Approved	For Release 2009/09/01 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000200400053-	3
	SECRET	
	THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE	ILLEGIB
	WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505	
National Intelligence	Council DDI 1440-82 19 February 1982	
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence	
VIA:	Chairman, National Intelligence Council	
FROM:	Charles E. Waterman National Intelligence Officer for NESA	
SUBJECT:	Libyan Task Force Meeting, 17 February	

The purpose of this meeting, chaired by State S/P Director Paul Wolfowitz, was to forge a consensus on the nature of economic sanctions to be adopted against Libya. The positions reached will be reflected in a document to be circulated prior to the National Security Council Meeting now to be scheduled for 23 or 25 February.

25X1

- 2. The general recommendations to be made in the document are the following:
 - A petroleum boycott should be applied, probably as first priority among any sanctions adopted. Authority for this will be the Trade Expansion Act.
 - Some form of export controls will be adopted, utilizing the Export Administration Act and not the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Treasury, Commerce, and State all concur that a procedure requiring licensing and banning of certain categories of exports is feasible. Essentially, it will place Libya in a similar category of restrictiveness for exports as the Soviet Union. Key questions to be decided at the NSC meeting will be whether retroactivity (for orders already placed) or extraterritoriality (for subsidies of US companies) should be applied to the export controls. Treasury and Commerce strongly feel they should not,. due to difficulties which would ensue with both the European allies and US businesses.

JCS review completed

Natio

NSC review completed.

25X1

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

2

3. The meeting had not been called to discuss again the appropriateness of the imposition of economic sanctions without further provocation. However, a rather strong debate did occur on this subject, prompted by NSC Policy and Plans Director Norm Bailey. His thesis, which was supported openly by the Treasury and Commerce Department representatives, is that the imposition of these measures would have no economic impact, anger our allies unnecessarily and essentially expose the President to unnecessary ridicule. This view was opposed by State S/P Director Wolfowitz, who stressed the important symbolic effect the economic measures will have. I expressed no opinion on this issue, nor did representatives from the JCS, ISA, and State NEA. Privately all of these representatives oppose proceeding automatically with these sanctions. All agreed that, if the steps are automatically imposed, an educational campaign with Congress and other key sectors should precede it.	, 25X1
4. I would think the <u>Washington Post</u> leak of Secretary Haig's comments regarding proceeding to "Phase 2" of our Libya policy will tend to reinforce the view of those who are inclined to oppose further action without ostensible Libyan provocations. Essentially, the <u>leak portrays</u> us as aggressors in the situation, rather than as defendants.	25 X 1
5. The JCS representative commented that no maneuvers in Libyan waters are now being planned. There is only one carrier in the Mediterranean at present, which is rather insufficient for prospective hostilities. This situation will pertain until June, when there will briefly be four carriers there. All agreed June would be the obvious time for any repeat of the Sidra operation which may be contemplated.	25 X 1
Charles E. Waterman	25X1

SECRET

SECRET

DDI 1440-82 19 February 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Libyan Task Force Meeting, 17 February

19 Feb. 82

25X1_{X1}

Distribution:

- 1 DCI
- 1 DDCI
- 1 ER
- 1 Executive Director
- 1 SA/IA
- 1 C/NIC
- 1 DDI
- 1 DDI Registry
- 1 D/NESA 1 C/NE/DDO
- 2 NIO/NESA